Budgetary constraints and programmatic choices by Flemish subsidized theatres by Werck, Kristien et al.
www.ssoar.info
Budgetary constraints and programmatic choices
by Flemish subsidized theatres
Werck, Kristien; Grinwis Plaat Stultjes, Mona; Heyndels, Bruno
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Werck, K., Grinwis Plaat Stultjes, M., & Heyndels, B. (2008). Budgetary constraints and programmatic choices by
Flemish subsidized theatres. Applied Economics, 40(18), 2369-2379. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036840600970153
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-239947
For Peer Review
Budgetary constraints and programmatic choices by Flemish subsidized 
theatres 
Journal: Applied Economics 
Manuscript ID: APE-05-0465.R1 
Journal Selection: Applied Economics 
JEL Code: L31 - Nonprofit Institutions < L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise < L - Industrial Organization 
Keywords: theatre, subsidies, programmatic choices 
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
For Peer Review
1
Budgetary constraints and programmatic choices 
by Flemish subsidized theatres
Kristien WERCK, 
Mona GRINWIS PLAAT STULTJES 
& Bruno HEYNDELS
Vrije Universiteit Brussel
Abstract. We analyse programmatic choices of Flemish theatres and examine how they are affected by 
the theatres’ budgetary situation.  Following Lancaster’s characteristics approach, we identify several 
output characteristics of individual Flemish theatres during the period 1980-2000.  A simultaneous 
equation approach is used to capture the theatre managers’, subsidizing government’s and consumers’ 
behaviour.  We find that changes in the budgetary situation of a theatre are translated into changes of 
both the ‘amount’ and the nature of the theatre’s output.  The budgetary impact on artistic choices has 
intensified since the introduction of a 4-yearly instead of yearly allocation of subsidies.  The decrease 
in financial risk for the individual theatres leads to an increase in artistic risk-taking. 
Key words: programmatic choices, theatre, subsidies
JEL: Z11
Corresponding author:
Kristien Werck 
Vrije Universiteit Brussel
Department of Economics – 2C137
Pleinlaan 2 
B-1050 Brussels, Belgium
Tel. +32 (0)2/629.14.20 
  Fax +32 (0)2/629.20.60 
E-mail: Kristien.Werck@vub.ac.be
Page 1 of 28
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
2
1.  Introduction 
Like any other firm, a theatre needs money.  Artistic productions can be presented to 
the audience only when sufficient budgetary means are available.  Broadly speaking, 
theatres rely on both the market (through ticket sales, sponsoring, …) and subsidizing 
governments to soften this constraint.  But popular or corporate support may increase 
or decrease, subsidies may be augmented or cut back.  For the theatre directors this 
means that the budgetary constraint loosens or tightens and action has to be 
undertaken.  Programmatic choices adjusting the theatrical output are a prime 
instrument for the theatre management.  It can adapt the number of performances or 
productions to the new budgetary situation or it can change the nature of the theatre’s
output.  These types of reactions are the focus of the present analysis.  More 
specifically, we examine how budgetary constraints affect the programmatic choices 
made by Flemish theatres.
The program of a performing arts organisation can be seen as the result of an 
economic optimisation process (Frey and Pommerehne, 1990).  The decision-maker, 
making programmatic choices, pursues certain objectives. A discussion on the 
objectives of managers in the non-profit performing arts is in Section 2.  Full 
realisation of these objectives is confined by budgetary constraints.  Section 3 reviews 
the literature on the impact of budgetary changes on artistic programming.    Section 4 
uses a panel of Flemish theatres (1980-2000) to analyse how budgetary changes affect 
programmatic choices.  We account explicitly for the heterogeneity of theatre output: 
programming corresponds to selecting a Lancasterian set of characteristics.  A 
simultaneous equation approach is used also incorporating the behaviour of 
consumers and of the subsidizing government.  A conclusion is in Section 5.
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2.  Objectives of (non-profit) theatre managers
A theatre manager making programmatic choices will – in most general terms –
maximise his/her utility under a set of constraints.  Most economic models of non-
profit performing arts organisations assume that theatre managers are biased towards 
the maximization of artistic quality (Krebs and Pommerehne, 1995).  The pursuit of 
quality can take many forms.  A theatre director could opt for quality by programming 
innovative, less popular works that appeal only to the most ‘refined’ tastes.  Quality 
could also be achieved by making the production of any work as impressive as 
possible, for example by a virtuoso performance, by lavish stage sets or costumes 
(Hansmann, 1981).
Although the quality objective dominates in the literature, alternatives have been 
suggested.  First, a theatre director could maximise audience size e.g. to spread culture 
to a broad segment of the population (Caves, 2000).  There may be a trade-off:  a 
‘highbrow’ (high quality) program may decrease audience sizes (Krebs and 
Pommerehne, 1995).  Other alternatives to quality maximization are budget 
maximization (Hansmann, 1981, 347)1, acquiring legitimacy of the organisation 
(DiMaggio, 1987) or maximisation of the theatre manager’s standing among his peers 
(Krebs and Pommerehne, 1995).  The latter objective may reflect the existence of 
agency problems (Du Bois et al., 2004). 
1
 His approach is in line with Niskanen’s description of the budget maximising bureaucracy (Niskanen, 
1971). Note that non-profit theatres are a particular example of a bureaucracy according to Niskanen’s 
definition of bureaus as “non-profit organisations which are financed, at least in part, by a periodic 
appropriation or grant” (Niskanen, 1971).
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3. Decision-making in the performing arts
A theatre manager faces constraints imposed by the ‘artistic technology’ and the 
budget.  The latter is typically composed of three parts: the public’s contribution in 
the form of ticket sales, corporate sponsoring and public subsidies.  Changes in the 
technology, prices of inputs and/or the budget can be expected to lead to other 
programmatic choices.  The cultural economics literature has focused on two issues: 
the impact of subsidy on output and the effect of increasing costs (input prices) on the 
performing arts in general.
Several empirical studies examine the effect of government subsidy on one particular 
aspect of theatrical output, namely the extent to which the repertoire is diverse or 
innovative.  The general assumption is that government support – as opposed to box 
office revenues or private donations - enhances artistic freedom and the possibility to 
experiment.  Martorella (1975) gives the example of the Metropolitan and Lyric 
Opera of Chicago.  These depend heavily on box office revenues.  Their programming 
turns out to be ‘conservative’.   In contrast, the New York City Opera that has been 
subsidized by the National Council of the Arts and the Ford Foundation, has been able 
to commission new works and present avant-garde or rarely performed operas.  
Heilbrun (2001) suggests that the increasing diversity in the Canadian opera repertoire 
(as compared to decreasing diversity in the U.S.) is explained by the higher levels of 
public support.  Pierce (2000) examines how variations in funding sources affect 
‘program conventionality’ of U.S. opera companies.  ‘Conventionality’ refers to the 
extent to which the program of an organisation is similar to the programs of other 
organisations.  Local government funding significantly increases conventionality.  A 
probable reason is that local politicians need to support programs that are popular.  
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The opposite effect was found for support from the National Endowment for the Arts: 
it decreases the conventionality of opera programming.  
Theatre studies largely support the hypothesis that public support increases diversity.  
Austen-Smith (1980) finds that subsidy encourages the presentation of minority 
interest plays in English provincial repertory theatres.  In their study of American 
resident theatres, DiMaggio and Stenberg (1985) show how a higher dependence on 
the market is associated with a greater conformity of repertoire.  In a study on English 
theatres, O’Hagan and Neligan (2005) find a negative relationship between subsidy as 
a proportion of total income and the conventionality of theatre programs.  
Baumol and Baumol (1985b) analyse the effect of ever-increasing costs on the output 
of performing arts organisations.   Their concept of the ‘suppressed cost disease’ is the 
less well-known brother of Baumol’s cost disease.  The intuition behind the latter is 
simple: (a) the labour intensive performing arts sector does not benefit from 
technological progress as much as other sectors and (b) the tendency for wages in the 
arts sector to follow wages elsewhere leads to ever-increasing costs (Baumol and 
Bowen, 1966).  When performing arts organisations make qualitative changes in their 
output due to cost pressures this is referred to as the suppressed form of the cost 
disease.  As a general rule, we expect increasing labour costs to induce a shift within 
the artistic sector from highly labour intensive productions to less labour intensive 
productions.  The cost disease leads then to a situation where performing arts 
institutions “debase the product” (Baumol and Baumol, 1985b, 222).  They may cut 
the number of rehearsals, perform in large capacity playhouses, use simpler sets …  in 
the economically feasible range of (artistic) options.  An obvious strategy is to reduce 
labour costs, since these typically make up for the largest part of total costs.  
Assuming that wages are more or less fixed, this requires reducing labour input.  One 
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way to do this is to produce plays with smaller casts.  Still, it might be difficult to 
produce a certain play with fewer actors. In the words of Alan Peacock: “Removing 
Judge Bouck from the cast of Hedda Gabler would certainly reduce labour input to 
Ibsen’s masterpiece, but it would also destroy the product” (Peacock, 1996, 219).  
But, of course, a change in the overall composition of the repertoire does make it 
possible to reduce labour input.  Evidence by Baumol and Baumol (1985a; 1985b) 
shows that this is exactly what happened on Broadway: the average cast size of plays 
fell from 15,8 to 8,1 between 1946 and 1977.  Another cost-saving option that affects 
the repertoire mix is to choose fewer modern works for which copyright fees have to 
be paid (Throsby, 1996).
4. Flemish theatres: 1980-2000
The Flemish professional theatre sector has gone through remarkable changes in the 
past decades.   As will be shown, the plays that appear on stage today are clearly 
different from those that were programmed 20 years ago.  Our analysis is restricted to 
those companies that have received ‘structural’ subsidies from the Flemish 
community.  Altogether these represent the (rather) well-established and professional 
Flemish theatre sector.  In Section 4.1 we describe the output of the Flemish theatres 
in the period 1980-2000.2  Section 4.2 gives the evolution of the theatres’ budget.  
Section 4.3 discusses several hypotheses concerning programmatic choices and the 
impact of budgetary restrictions.  The empirical analysis is in Section 4.4.
2
 We consider the seasons 1980-1981 until 2000-2001.  In the remainder of this study, theatre seasons 
will be referred to by the first year mentioned (for example, the season 1993-1994 will be referred to by 
the year 1993). 
Page 6 of 28
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
7
4.1 The description of Flemish theatre output
To examine the changes in the Flemish theatre output, we describe output at the level 
of the individual theatres.  Rather than focusing on the level of theatre output only, we 
also account for the heterogeneity of output.  Theatre productions differ considerably 
from one another in many dimensions.  Analysing decision-making in the context of 
the performing arts should explicitly account for such differences (Throsby, 1990).  
Lancaster’s characteristics approach then suggests itself as a tool of analysis 
(Lancaster, 1966).  Following this approach, a theatre production consists of a unique 
set of N characteristics zi (i = 1, …, N) like the language of the play, the period in 
which the play was written, the number of actors on stage, their identity, and so on:
Z    = Z { z1, z2, z3, …, zN }
From the theatre manager’s perspective, a programmatic choice on what plays to put 
on stage corresponds with a choice of specific values for all zi.  More generally, 
programmatic choices involve not only the choice of a given play to perform but 
rather the choice of a set of plays (sets of characteristics) that are performed during a 
given season along with a decision on how often each given play will be performed, 
…  
The Lancasterian characteristics approach has been incorporated into the empirical 
literature on performing arts attendance.  In a demand study of 3 Australian theatre 
companies, Throsby (1990) includes a variable for repertoire classification.  Using 
dummy variables, plays are classified into four groups according to the date of 
composition and the familiarity of the playwright.  Abbé-Decarroux (1994) estimates 
the demand for 64 productions of a Swiss theatre company.  He classifies the 
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repertoire into classic, modern, contemporary and atypical plays based on the date the 
plays were written and on whether the playwright is a living author or not.  Analysing 
demand for French theatres, Urrutiaguer (2002) divides the repertoire into four 
categories according to the date of composition, the date of birth and the mother 
tongue of the playwright.  Dummy variables express whether the share of 
performances programmed by a theatre and belonging to a certain category is 10 % 
higher than the overall average or not.  Corning and Levy (2002) examine demand for 
performances of the Pacific Conservatory of the Performing Arts.  They include 
indicators for comedies, musicals, and dramas as well as a specific variable for the 
musical ‘Tommy’.  
As these studies show, the choice of relevant characteristics to describe output is not 
straightforward.  We identify several characteristics to describe qualitative aspects of 
individual theatre productions.  The following 5 characteristics are considered3: 
• z1: the original language of the play
• z2: the age of the playwright 
• z3: the fact whether the play is an adaptation4 or not
• z4: the number of actors 
• z5: the fact whether the production is new or a retake 
3
 The selection of the characteristics was driven by the literature  and the availability of data. Data on 
programmatic choices come from the ‘Vlaamse Theaterjaarboeken’ over the period 1980-1998, the 
database of the ‘Vlaams Theater Instituut’ and the Flemish Ministry of Culture.
4
 An adaptation is an existing story or play that serves as the source of inspiration for a Flemish author 
who transforms it in an innovative way
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As these characteristics describe individual theatre productions, the relevant 
description of the program of a theatre for a whole season – a set of productions – can 
be seen in terms of an aggregation of these characteristics.  To describe programmatic 
choices involving the quantity of output we look at: 
• the number of productions
• the number of performances per production.
Werck and Heyndels (2005) show how the choice of repertoire by Flemish theatres 
changed.  Over the period 1980-2000 the share of plays by non-Dutch-speaking  
authors fell dramatically (from 79 to 26 % of all plays), there was a tendency towards 
more recent plays and more adaptations. A notable evolution concerns the cast size.  
Whereas 5,77 actors appeared on stage in the average production in 1980, there are 
only 4,38 actors per production in 2000.  Finally, more productions are being retaken.   
The output of the Flemish theatres has also undergone changes in terms of quantity.  
The average number of productions per theatre increased (from 5,22 in 1980 to 8,04 
in 2000) while at the same time the number of performances per production fell (from 
almost 40 to 20).    
4.2 The evolution of the budgetary situation
The budget of the Flemish theatres consists of two main sources: structural subsidies 
of the Flemish Community and own (box-office) income.5  The former typically cover 
5 Local governments - municipalities and provinces - also subsidize theatres.  However, due 
to the large number of missing data, we did not take these subsidies into account.
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between 48 and 52 % of all expenses.  Different legislations have regulated the 
allocation of subsidies.   Before 1975, only the large ‘repertoire’ theatres and a few 
‘chamber’ theatres received subsidies.  The ‘Theaterdecreet’ (Theatre Decree) from 
1975 and the ‘Podiumkunstendecreet’ (Performing Arts Decree) from 1993 shaped 
the currently existing system. A crucial innovation in the latter Decree is the 
replacement of the yearly allocation of subsidies by a system of ‘structural’ subsidies 
assigned for 4 year-periods.  This institutional change was welcomed by the theatres 
as it facilitated them to plan activities for a number of years without the (financial) 
uncertainty that was current practice before 1993 (Brouwers, 1994). 
The budgetary means of the Flemish theatres fluctuated over the years.  After an 
initial decline in the early 80s the total available budget (subsidies and box office) for 
all subsidized theatres increased again to a maximum of €23,6 million in 1999 (in 
prices of 1996).  The average theatre budget fluctuated between € 650.000 in the early 
80s to almost € 946.000 in 1999.  Naturally, the evolution in subsidies was largely 
responsible for these fluctuations: total subsidies fell from over €17,4 million in the 
early 80s to €13,4 million in 1986, after which they started to rise again.  Average 
theatre subsidies were around € 572.000 in 1980 and increased to € 650.000 for the 
period 1997-2000.  
4.3 Budgetary changes and Flemish theatre output
When making programmatic choices, the theatre manager has to take into account the 
constraints imposed by the public, by the subsidizing bodies and by its own 
technology.  Depending on the objective(s) of the organisation, different hypotheses 
on the effect of budgetary changes can be made.  A quality-maximising manager 
could be biased towards a theatre program that is artistically diverse (e.g. with a 
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maximum number of different productions).   Audience-maximising managers may 
prefer larger numbers of performances.  They may be biased towards more ‘popular’ 
plays.6  Depending on which objective dominates, there exists a trade-off between the 
number of productions and the number of performances per production.  
By retaking old productions, certain fixed production costs (such as scenery and 
costumes) can be avoided, and the number of rehearsals can possibly be limited.  
However, it is a programmatic choice that quality-maximising theatre managers might 
be reluctant to make, as it does not enhance artistic diversity (Grinwis, 2002).  
Therefore, we expect such theatre managers to decrease the number of retakes when 
more budgetary means are available.
It is not straightforward to make a priori assumptions on the evolution of output 
characteristics under changing budgetary restrictions.  The choice of repertoire – and 
the actors performing it – is one of the most important decisions to be made.  
Reducing cast size seems an obvious way to reduce labour costs.  Hence, a theatre 
manager may decrease (increase) cast size when confronted with a tightening 
(expanding) budget.  Of course, when a quality-maximising manager regards large 
productions to be important, he will be reluctant to reduce average cast size.  
Similarly, an audience-maximising manager will have a preference for large 
productions if they attract more theatregoers.  
6
 An audience-maximising manager is indifferent between programming n different plays with each 
one performance, or performing 1 production n  times.  Still, as programming a new production has 
sizeable fixed costs he will perform as few plays as possible (the constraint being that the play has to be 
popular enough to fill the theatre).
Page 11 of 28
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
12
The choice of a play that is contemporary, an adaptation of a classic play or of a play 
that is written by a Dutch-speaking playwright has less clear-cut budgetary 
implications.  Still, cost-saving measures are possible, e.g. by programming fewer 
modern works for which copyright fees have to be paid (Throsby, 1996; Baumol and 
Baumol, 1985b).  Again, a quality-maximising theatre manager who regards 
innovation as indispensable will be less willing to take such a measure. 
It is clear that programmatic choices are taken simultaneously.  Moreover, decision-
making is intrinsically interdependent if only because subsidizing bodies take into 
account (past) programmatic choices as well (Jenkins and Austen-Smith, 1987; 
Luksetich and Lange, 1995).  Politicians who decide on the level of subsidization face 
a re-election constraint.  Therefore they may want to try and avoid drops in popular 
support.  Theatre managers take this into account and will be careful not to provoke 
politicians, for example by falling short of box office income or by attracting negative 
publicity (Krebs and Pommerehne, 1995).  Demand will also be affected by 
programmatic choices.  Werck and Heyndels (2005) found that Flemish theatre 
attendance is positively affected by large cast sizes and plays written by Dutch-
speaking playwrights.  Expectations about consumers’ reactions are likely to feed 
back into the programmatic decision-making, as attendance has a budgetary impact 
through the box-office.  
4.4 Empirical analysis
Responses to budgetary changes are examined using data on all theatres that were 
subsidized during the period 1980-2000.  Our data set consists of an unbalanced panel 
of 59 theatres.  The set of theatres varies over time as some theatres cease to exist, 
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others continue to exist but no longer receive structural subsidies, and new theatres 
are created and subsidized.7
To model all aspects of theatre behaviour and to incorporate the simultaneity of 
decision-making, we estimate a system of simultaneous equations.   Quantitative 
output measures, output characteristics, subsidies, attendance and ticket price are 
determined simultaneously. Quantitative output measures for theatre i in year t are the 
number of productions (PRODi,t) and the number of performances per productions 
(RUNi,t).  Five output characteristics are taken as dependent variables.  CASTi,t stands 
for the average cast size of all productions of theatre i in year t.  INNOi,t is a measure 
for artistic innovation.  It corresponds with the proportion of new productions to total 
productions.  ADAPTi,t gives the share of adaptations relative to the number of 
productions of the company.  The dependent variable AGEi,t, is a proxy for the age of 
the plays.  It corresponds with the difference between t and the average birth year of 
the playwrights of all productions of the company.  Finally, DUTCHi,t gives the 
proportion of plays (originally) written in Dutch.  These main choice variables of the 
individual theatres are determined taking into account possible effects on subsidies 
(SUBi,t), attendance (Qi,t) and on the average ticket price charged (Pi,t).  Table 1 gives 
a summary of the system of simultaneous equations.  
[Insert Table 1 
about here]
The explanatory variables comprise theatre-specific and market specific determinants.  
For the latter, a distinction is made between touring and non-touring theatres through 
a dummy variable, PLAYHi,t, which equals 1 when a company is residing in its own 
7
 The number of subsidized theatres in any given year varies between 24 and 35. 
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playhouse and 0 when it is a touring company with no fixed location.  The difference 
between the two types is important since they serve different types of markets.  In 
principle, touring companies can perform in the whole Flemish and Brussels Region.  
Their ‘relevant market’ therefore corresponds with the complete set of (308) Flemish 
and (19) Brussels municipalities.  Non-touring companies perform in a playhouse in a 
particular municipality.  Hence, their ‘relevant market’ is more limited in size.  This 
difference between the two types is accounted for in the definitions of market specific 
explanatory variables: population size, consumer income and the prices of substitutes: 
cinema and other theatres’ productions.  
Population size (POPi,t) is used as a proxy for the size of the ‘relevant market’ of 
theatre company i.  For touring companies this corresponds with the total population 
in all Flemish and Brussels municipalities. For non-touring companies the market is 
geographically limited.  It is natural to consider the municipality in which the 
playhouse resides as part of its ‘relevant market’.  Still, it is most likely that the
market extends beyond the borders of this municipality.  Just how far this market 
extends is an empirical issue.  Werck and Heyndels (2005), analyzing demand for 
Flemish theatres, compare a number of possibilities.  They define a 327 x 327 spatial 
weighting matrix W (Revelli, 2001, 2003).  Elements of the matrix, wjk, equal 1 if 
municipality k is part of the ‘relevant market’ for theatre i (located in j) and 0 
otherwise. They find a preferred specification in which wjk=1 in the municipality 
where the theatre is located (j=k) as well as in its border sharing municipalities.  We 
use this result for our own analysis.  In practical terms, this means that POPi,t for a 
non-touring theatre i corresponds to the sum of the population in the municipality 
where i is located and in its neighbouring municipalities.  
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Consumer income (Yi,t) and  the prices of substitutes - cinema ticket price 
(PCINEMAi,t) and the ticket price of other theatre companies (PSUBTHEAi,t) - are 
also defined in terms of the ‘relevant market’.  For touring companies this means that 
Yi,t, PCINEMAi,t and PSUBTHEAi,t correspond to the average per capita income 
(weighted by population), the average movie ticket price and the average ticket price 
of all other theatres in the Flemish and Brussels Region.  For non-touring companies, 
the averages are again calculated for the theatre’s own and neighbouring 
municipalities. 8,9
Equations (1) to (7) are of central interest.  The first two equations have the 
quantitative output variables as dependent variables.  Equations (3) to (7) treat the 
output characteristics.  Each output variable is estimated as a function of its own lag 
and the theatre’s budget (BUDGETi,t).10  The budget consists of own (box-office) 
income and government subsidy.   As mentioned, two regimes can be distinguished.  
Until 1992 subsidies were allocated on a yearly basis.  Since then, a 4-year allocation 
is in use.  Responses to budgetary pressures may have changed.  To take this into 
account we interact BUDGETi,t with a dummy DSt that identifies the subsidy regime.  
DSt=1 in the years from 1993 onwards (4-year allocation regime) and 0 in the 
preceding period. 11
8
 The relevant market’s income is an average weighted by population.   
9
 In practice, movie theatres are only located in (relatively) large municipalities and not in their 
neighbouring municipalities.  Hence, using or not using the spatial weighting matrix makes no 
difference.  Formally, however, the ‘relevant market’ spreads over to neighbouring municipalities even 
if in these municipalities no substitute (cinema) is present.
10
 A specification with the lagged value of the budget was estimated as well.  The results were similar 
to those presented in the main text.  
11
 Following the current practice in empirical work on political budget cycles, we experimented with 
alternatives for DS.  We defined a variable TUSt which gives the ‘time until the following subsidy 
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Ticket price, subsidy and theatre attendance are determined simultaneously with the 
programmatic decision variables.  Price, Pi,t, is estimated as a function of attendance 
in the previous season, Qi,t-1, as well as the output variables and consumer income Yi,t
(equation 8).  Equation 9 examines whether subsidy, SUBi,t, is dependent on a 
theatre’s  achievements in the previous season.  Finally, equation 10 estimates the 
demand for theatre as a function of ticket price, consumer income, population, the 
price of cinema and the average price charged by other theatre companies as well as 
the output characteristics (see Werck and Heyndels, 2005). 
The equation system summarized in Table 1 is an over-identified system of 
simultaneous equations.  We use 3-stage least squares as the simultaneous equation 
method, which yields more efficient results than single equation estimations when the 
disturbances are correlated across equations.12
[Insert Table 2 
about here]
round’.  So TUSt = 0 in all years before 1993 as well as in 1996 and 2000 (in the latter years decisions 
are taken on the subsidies for the following 4 years);  TUSt = 1 in 1995 and 1999, 2 in 1994 and 1998 
and 3 in 1993 and 1997.  We could not find evidence of a ‘budget cycle’.    
12
 A Hausman specification test examines the correct system specification, and determines whether 
2SLS or 3SLS is the appropriate estimation technique. The results show that a simultaneous equations 
model is a better estimation technique (2SLS or 3SLS) than a single equation system (OLS), and that 
the full-information method (3SLS) provides better estimates than a limited-information method 
(2SLS). 
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Table 2 summarises the results.  Before turning to the coefficients of central interest 
(those on BUDGET variables) we briefly discuss the other findings.  We restrict 
ourselves to the results in columns (1) to (7) as these are the main focus of our article.  
A first observation is that, overall, the lagged variables of the output variables are 
highly significant, demonstrating that programmatic choices are strongly ‘determined’ 
by choices from the past.  This reflects that individual theatres have their own specific 
‘identity’ as a result of which artistic choices show stability over time.   
A second general finding is the apparent distinction between touring and non-touring 
(resident) companies.  The latter program larger numbers of different productions.  
This reflects the larger ‘relevant’ market of the touring companies.  Since most 
theatregoers are not likely to attend the same production more than once, non-touring 
theatre companies are obliged to offer a ‘diverse’ program in order to attract potential 
theatregoers coming from within a certain distance from the playhouse.13  As equation 
4 shows, the playhouse dummy has a significant and positive effect on innovation: 
non-touring theatre companies on average program more new productions.  This 
might be explained by their more limited potential audience (smaller ‘relevant 
market’).  The proportion of ‘Dutch’ plays in the program is significantly lower for 
resident companies.  A possible explanation is – again – that they are ‘obliged’ to 
present a more diverse program (as their ‘relevant market’ is smaller) in combination 
with the fact that the Dutch-language repertoire is limited relative to the overall 
theatre repertoire.  
13
 This result seems to be in line with the finding by DiMaggio and Stenberg (1985) for U.S. resident 
theatres. They find that resident theatres with a larger market have a less ‘conformist’ repertoire.  Of 
course, diversity as measured by the number of different productions is not the same as 
‘nonconformity’ as measured by DiMaggio and Stenberg’s Conformity Index.     
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Turning to the impact of budgetary changes which are the focus of the current 
analysis two main conclusions can be drawn.  First, we find clear evidence that the 
theatre’s budget has an immediate impact on both the quantity and the nature of the 
output.  Second, the introduction of the 4-year subsidy regime in 1993 has
dramatically changed this relationship.
In the pre-1993 period (when subsidies where allocated on a yearly basis) budgetary 
changes translate into changes in the number of productions and the cast size 
(equations (1) and (3) respectively).  Higher budgets are associated with more artistic 
diversity as reflected by the increased number of different productions.  On the other 
hand, there is a negative but insignificant relationship between the budget and the 
average number of performances per production (equation 2).   These results suggest 
that – given sufficient means - theatre managers prefer programming different 
productions rather than extending the average run of a production.  As there is an 
obvious cost difference between staging a new production and programming an extra 
performance of an existing production, this result may reflect that Flemish theatre 
managers maximise quality (defined in terms of programmatic diversity) rather than 
quantity.  Only when forced by the budgetary pressure, the number of productions 
will be lowered.  Negative changes in the budget lead the theatre to lower the number 
of productions while keeping the average run constant.     
Before 1993 the theatre’s budgetary situation not only affects the artistic diversity in 
terms of the quantity of plays.  Budgets also have systematic effects on the nature of 
these plays.  Column (3) reveals a highly significant and positive relationship between 
a theatre’s budget and the average cast size of the productions in a given season.  
Increased budgets are used to expand cast sizes, probably by staging larger 
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productions.14  As such the evolution on Flemish theatre scenes towards plays with 
smaller cast sizes (as sketched in section 4.1) can be attributed – at least in part – to 
budgetary pressures.   This structural decline in average cast size in Flemish 
subsidized theatres is to our knowledge the first confirmation of Baumol and 
Baumol’s (1985a; 1985b) findings on the so-called suppressed cost disease.   
Under the yearly subsidy regime though, we find no significant budgetary influence 
on the proportion of new productions, the choice for contemporary plays, adaptations 
or plays written by a Dutch-speaking playwright.  
After 1993, this situation changes dramatically with the introduction of the 4-yearly 
subsidies.  While the responsiveness of the number of productions to budgetary 
changes is not significantly affected – also in the post 1993 period higher budgets lead 
to higher numbers of productions - for all other output variables we find a significant 
difference with the pre-1993 period.  Indeed, the coefficient on the interaction term is 
significant in equations (2) to (7).    First, BUDGET*DS has a negatively significant 
effect on the number of performances per production (RUN).  During the 4-year 
regime higher budgets translate into less performances per production and (as in the 
pre-1993 period) into larger numbers of productions.  This change in behavior is 
consistent with the observation that theatre managers work in a financially less risky 
environment.  As they are assured of a sizeable part of their budgets they can ‘afford’ 
to take the more costly and (in terms of ticket sales) risky decision to choose for new 
productions instead of longer runs.   
14
 Alternatively cast size expansions can reflect the situation where individual actors do no longer play 
multiple roles within one and the same play.  While such a situation is not inexistent in Flemish 
theatres, it can by no means explain the empirical effect found in table 2.
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Second, a similar change towards more risky programmatic choices may be reflected 
in the fact that, after 1993, looser budgetary constraints lead theatres to stage more 
recent plays (equation (6)) and more adaptations (equation (5)).    Tighter budgets on 
the other hand induce (less risky) choices for older and well-established plays that are 
then performed in their ‘original’ version. 
However, the tendency towards using the budget in order to present an artistically 
more risky program since the introduction of the 4-yearly subsidy regime is possibly 
contradicted by the observation in column (4).  There we find that larger budgets in 
the post-1992 period lead to less innovation defined in terms of the share of new 
productions to retakes.15
Finally, column (3) reveals a striking shift in theatres’ responses to budgetary 
changes.  Whereas, as discussed, in the pre-1993 period higher budgets translate 
readily into larger casts, this relation is no longer apparent since the introduction of 
the four-year regime.  While there remains a positive effect (the sum of the 
coefficients on BUDGET and BUDGET*DS is still significantly positive), it is now 
much lower.  Larger (lower) budgets no longer lead to strong increases (decreases) in 
the average cast size.  A possible explanation is that theatres use additional budgetary 
means to conform their programmatic choices to the subsidizer’s preferences.  Before 
1993 theatre managers enjoyed relatively less freedom.  The subsidizing government 
made explicit reference to the priority that should be given to (artistic) employment.  
15
 We have no straightforward explanation for this unless, maybe, that the main incentive to choose for 
new productions is to convince the subsidizing government to grant (more) subsidies.  Indeed, as can 
be seen from column (9) theatres that are very innovative in these terms systematically receive higher 
subsidies.  This incentive (to convince the subsidizing body) is likely to be smaller under the 4-year 
subsidy regime. 
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Theatres received subsidies to spend on wages and general operations.  They were 
obliged to spend minimally 90 % of their personnel expenses on actors and directors 
that were binded to the theatre by contract.  Since 1993 this obligation is no longer 
present and, given that subsidies are allocated for 4-year periods, this seems to have 
changed the nature of the theatres’ dependence on government subsidies.   
5. Conclusions
Programmatic choices by theatre managers are not taken in isolation.  Decisions on 
which plays to perform, what actors to attract, how often to perform a given play, … 
reflect the objectives pursued by theatre managers and the constraints they face.  We 
analyse how programmatic choices by Flemish subsidized theatres depend on their 
budgetary constraints.  As these (non-profit) theatres depend heavily on government 
grants, the budgetary constraint not only reflects a dependency on the market  but also 
on the government.  Empirically analysing programmatic choices is therefore only 
possible through estimation of a simultaneous equation system that accounts for this 
interdependency between theatre managers, the public and the government.  We 
estimate such a model on an (unbalanced) panel of theatres that have received 
structural subsidies from the Flemish Regional government (over the period 1980-
2000).   
We find that theatres’ budgets have an impact not only on the number of plays they 
perform but also on their nature.  While indirect, our results offer to our knowledge 
the first systematic empirical evidence of Baumol’s suppressed cost disease.  This 
notion refers to a qualitative change in the artistic output in the performing arts due to 
relative price changes. 
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A crucial observation is that the budgetary impact on programmatic choices depends 
on the subsidy regime.  In the period under consideration, the Flemish government 
changed the institutional context: until 1992 subsidies were assigned on a yearly basis, 
since 1993 a 4-yearly subsidy regime came in place.  Interestingly, this change in 
subsidy regime is reflected in the way that theatres respond to budgetary changes.  
Under the yearly regime changes in a theatre’s budget only affect the number of 
productions (artistic diversity) and the average cast size.  Under the 4-yearly regime, 
budgetary changes have a much more ‘general’ impact on the nature of the theatrical 
output: theatres still respond to positive budgetary changes by increasing the number 
of productions and by increasing cast size (though much less than in the pre-1993 
period).  At the same time, however, they choose for shorter runs, less innovation, 
more adaptations and more recent plays and plays written in Dutch.  All but the 
responses in terms of innovation (the share of new productions relative to retakes is 
actually lowered when theatres are given more budgetary leeway) reflect how theatres 
in a 4-yearly subsidy regime use additional revenue to make artistically more risky 
choices.   Artistic risk – a choice variable of the individual theatres – substitutes the 
financial risk which was imposed by the yearly subsidy regime.
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Table 1: Simultaneous equations model
Quantity of output supplied
(1) Productions PRODi,t =  f (PRODi,t-1, BUDGETi,t, BUDGETi,t*DSt, PLAYHi,t)
(2) Performances per production RUNi,t =  f (RUNi,t-1, BUDGETi,t, BUDGETi,t*DSt, PLAYHi,t)
Output characteristics
(3) Average cast size CASTi,t = f (CASTi,t-1, BUDGETi,t, BUDGETi,t*DSt, PLAYHi,t)
(4) Innovation (proportion of new productions) INNOi,t = f (INNOi,t-1, BUDGETi,t, BUDGETi,t*DSt, PLAYHi,t)  
(5) Proportion of adaptations ADAPTi,t = f (ADAPTi,t-1, BUDGETi,t, BUDGETi,t*DSt, PLAYHi,t)  
(6) Average age of the playwrights AGEi,t = f (AGEi,t-1, BUDGETi,t, BUDGETi,t*DSt, PLAYHi,t)    
(7) Proportion of Dutch language plays DUTCHi,t = f (DUTCHi,t-1, BUDGETi,t, BUDGETi,t*DSt, PLAYHi,t)  
Price
(8) Price Pi,t = f (Qi,t-1, PRODi,t, RUNi,t, CASTi,t, INNOi,t, ADAPTi,t, AGEi,t, DUTCHi,t, Yi,t, PLAYHi,t)
Government subsidy
(9) Subsidy SUBi,t = f (Qi,t-1, PRODi,t-1, RUNi,t-1, CASTi,t-1, INNOi,t-1, ADAPTi,t-1, AGEi,t-1,  DUTCHi,t-1, PLAYHi,t)
Consumer demand
(10) Demand Qi,t = f (Pi,t, Yi,t, POPi,t, PSUBTHEAi,t, PCINEMAi,t, CASTi,t, INNOi,t, ADAPTi,t, AGEi,t, DUTCHi,t, PLAYHi,t)
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Table 2: 3SLS estimation results 
Dependent variablesIndependent 
variables Prod(1)
Run
(2)
Cast
(3)
Inno
(4)
Adapt
(5)
Age
(6)
Dutch
(7)
P
(8)
Sub
(9)
Q
(10)
Constant 1,38***
(6,24)
17,64***
(10,95)
1,71***
(9,05)
0,46***
(13,44)
0,06***
(3,99)
78,98***
(7,83)
0,24***
(7,60)
0,63
(0,13)
-0,06
(-0,78)
78,09
(0,58)
Prod
-1 0,65***(18,46) 0,01**(2,46)
Run
-1 0,44***(12,25)
-4,01E-03***
(-4,05)
Cast
-1 0,46***(10,43)
0,04***
(8,45)
Inno
-1 0,31***(7,02)
0,23***
(4,64)
Adapt
-1 0,33***(7,62)
0,07
(1,07)
Age
-1 0,11***(2,70) 1,85E-04*(1,91)
Dutch
-1 0,54***(14,47) -3,47E-03(-0,09)
Budget 0,68**
(2,32)
-0,17
(-0,11)
1,80***
(5,93)
1,55E-03
(0,06)
-2,44E-03
(-0,12)
20,62
(1,50)
-0,03
(-0,81)
Budget * DS 0,20
(0,81)
-3,53**
(-2,43)
-1,01***
(-4,64)
-0,07***
(-2,60)
0,06***
(2,87)
-45,15***
(-3,58)
0,16***
(5,05)
Playh 0,68**
(2,44)
0,05
(0,03)
0,07
(0,31)
0,10***
(3,48)
-0,01
(-0,53)
17,25
(1,24)
-0,12***
(-3,45)
0,28
(0,31)
0,25***
(8,36)
-141,95
(-1,16)
Q
-1 -0,12***(-8,39)
5,25E-03***
(9,04)
Prod 0,22
(1,52)
Run 0,09**
(2,05)
Cast 1,20***
(5,06)
7,50***
(3,59)
Inno -11,28***
(-2,93)
-56,87
(-1,43)
Adapt 8,32*
(1,92)
50,73
(1,06)
Age -2,07E-03
(-0,12)
0,07
(0,38)
Dutch -1,09
(-0,45)
-14,85
(-0,55)
P -12,30***
(-5,52)
Y 9,66E-04***
(3,05)
0,02***
(4,25)
Pop -0,02
(-1,09)
Pcinema 10,08
(1,44)
Psubthea -1,13
(-0,40)
R² 0,60 0,19 0,60 0,15 0,11 0,05 0,41 0,08 0,73 0,18
No. of observations = 447
Notes: t-values in parentheses, *** significant at 1 %, ** at 5 %, * at 10 %; 
Q, Q-1 and Pop in (.000); Sub and Budget in (.000 000).
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